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Abstract 
 
We study customers’ and brands’ preferences 
towards public and private customer service 
interactions on social media. Using a natural 
experiment where the ease of private communication 
with a brand is exogenously and significantly increased, 
we found that complaining customers prefer to do so 
publicly while some non-complaining customers prefer 
to communicate privately. However, through a 
randomized field experiment, we found that firms 
prioritize complaints received from the private channel 
over complaints received from the public channel. 
Therefore, brands, well aware of the risk of subjecting 
its customer service under public scrutiny, prefer 
complaints communicated privately and seem to nudge 
customers towards switching back to the traditional 
mode of customer service where all interactions are 
private. The divergent preferences towards open voice 
and private message suggest a hidden tug of war 
between the traditional delivery of customer service 
featuring brand control and social media customer 
service featuring transparency and openness. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
How do we respond when the perceived quality of 
a good or service is below our expectation? Hirschman 
[15] argues that there are essentially two responses: exit, 
that is, to discontinue the relation, or voice, that is, to 
repair through the communication of complaint or 
proposal for change. Hirschman’s theory of exit and 
voice provides a unifying conceptual framework to 
understanding economic and political actions people 
may take when something goes wrong with the 
operation of an organization. To reduce exits, it is 
crucial that customers or the public can easily 
communicate their complaints and suggestions. 
Therefore, delivering customer service or offering 
                                                 
1 Source: http://time.com/3916355/social-media-customer-service/ 
(Last access: Aug 27th, 2018) 
people a voicing channel has always been an essential 
part of any business in a market economy or any 
government in a democratic society. 
Conceptually, we can further distinguish two types 
of voices: private voice, which refers to voices solely 
communicated with the responsible party and not visible 
to the general public, and public voice, which refers to 
voices communicated with the responsible party but 
also visible to the general public. Unlike the political 
context where public voicing and debate is common, 
most of the customer service interaction in the business 
context is private, whether the customer service is 
delivered in person, by phone, through email, or more 
recently, via chatbot. This distinction, however, is 
starting to disappear with the emergence of social media 
customer service. Nowadays, companies routinely 
respond to and sometimes address customer complaints 
publicly on social media platforms such as Facebook 
and Twitter [14]. For example, on Twitter, a disgruntled 
customer can publicly complain to a brand by 
mentioning the official account name of a brand with the 
symbol @. The brand typically replies to the customer 
publicly on Twitter as well. If there is a need to 
exchange sensitive information, they can use direct 
message (i.e., DM) on Twitter to communicate privately.  
From the perspective of customers, the new option 
of publicly complaining to a brand clearly empowers 
them, especially for those with large social media 
influence. Indeed, there are reports that dissatisfied 
customers only had their issues resolved after they 
switched from the traditional customer service via 
phone line to the social media customer service. 1 
Moreover, social psychology theory suggests that when 
people perceive themselves as being treated unfairly, 
there is an inherent need to restore the emotional balance 
[9]. Publicly venting about the brand is often an 
effective and efficient way of achieving such a balance. 
Given these benefits, we conjecture that customers who 
complain through social media will prefer to voice 
publicly. On the other hand, for customers who merely 
seek some information from the firm, it is possible that 
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some of them prefer the private channel because of the 
comfort of privacy. To evaluate these conjectures, we 
use a natural experiment (from the perspective of 
customers) in 2016 when Delta Air Lines adopted 
OpenDM on Twitter, a new feature that allows anyone 
to send a private message to Delta Air Lines on Twitter 
without first being followed by or following Delta. To 
Delta’s customers, this sudden availability of OpenDM 
exogenously and dramatically increased the ease of 
using private channel to communicate their complaints. 
Indeed, with OpenDM, there is no real difference in 
terms of the convenience between complaining publicly 
on Twitter or privately through direct message. If all 
customers who complain to the brand on social media 
prefer to do so publicly, we should not expect any 
statistically significant drop in the number of public 
complaints after the adoption of OpenDM, everything 
else equal. On the other hand, if some non-complaining 
customers (e.g., information seeking) prefer to 
communicate privately with the brand, we should expect 
a statistically significant drop in the number of non-
complaints communicated to the brand publicly, 
everything else equal. To summarize, we propose the 
following two hypotheses for empirical testing: 
Hypothesis 1A: There is no statistically significant 
change in the number of publicly communicated 
complaints before and after the adoption of OpenDM, 
everything else equal. 
Hypothesis 1B: There is a drop in the number of 
publicly communicated non-complaints after the 
adoption of OpenDM, everything else equal. 
The clear benefits for consumers to have this public 
customer service channel, aided by the ubiquity of smart 
phones and social media technology, perhaps explains 
the growing popularity of firms delivering customer 
service through social media platforms such as Twitter 
and Facebook.  However, from a brand’s perspective, 
there are both direct benefits and risk associated with 
this new customer service channel. By publicly 
responding to a complaining customer, rather than 
ignoring the complaint, the brand is publicly 
demonstrating its willingness and effort to correct its 
mistake, which may potentially serve as a positive 
marketing message. However, by subjecting its 
customer service under public scrutiny, the brand also 
risks failing to respond to or address a complaint 
publicly, which may further trigger additional 
complaints and criticisms. Recent research suggests that 
most customers who received customer service through 
social media actually felt the same or worse after their 
interactions with the brand [12]. Hence, it is likely that 
for a typical brand, the risk of delivering customer 
service on social media outweighs the direct benefit of 
doing so, but shunning away from this new channel is 
likely an even worse strategy because the avoidance can 
signal the brand’s lack of confidence or openness, 
especially if its competitors or firms in other industries 
are already delivering customer service via social media. 
Given this dilemma, we conjecture that firms will prefer 
to deliver social media customer service as privately as 
possible. For example, on Twitter, firms may promote 
or incentivize, directly or indirectly, the use of direct 
messaging for customers to voice their complaints. By 
keeping complaints and conversations private, firms 
essentially turn social media customer service into yet 
another form of traditional customer service akin to 
customer service through email, albeit in a more 
efficient way. Therefore, we propose the following two 
hypotheses for empirical testing: 
Hypothesis 2A: Firms are more likely to respond 
to customer complaints communicated privately than to 
complaints communicated publicly. 
Hypothesis 2B: Firms are more likely to respond 
faster to customer complaints communicated privately 
than to complaints communicated publicly. 
To test these two hypotheses, we resort to a 
randomized field experiment on a popular social media 
platform where similar complaining messages are 
communicated to firms through either a public or a 
private channel.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: after 
briefly reviewing the literature in the next section, we 
first present the natural experiment to test Hypotheses 
1A and 1B. Then, we present the randomized field 
experiment to test Hypotheses 2A and 2B. Finally, we 
conclude the paper by summarizing the contributions 
and limitations of this research. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Our research is broadly related to the vast literature 
on consumer complaint behavior and is most closely 
related to the small stream of literature on customers’ 
choice of complaint channels. 
Consumer Complaint Behavior (CCB). Complaints 
often result from a disparity between consumers’ 
expectations in the pre-purchase stage and 
disconfirmation in the post-purchase stage [6]. Different 
causes of product failure may lead to different forms of 
complaints such as demanding a refund or an exchange 
for the product, or an apology from the firm [10]. Post-
purchase complaints include consumer-initiated 
communication to marketers, their channel members, or 
public agencies, to obtain remedy or restitution for 
purchase or usage-related problems [19]. Firms 
regularly provide services to address complaints and 
dissatisfaction, and firms’ successful remedial actions—
such as providing refund, exchange, or repair—may be 
able to help retain customers [4]; meanwhile, firms’ 
inappropriate handling of customers’ redress can lead to 
negative word-of-mouth and damage businesses [3]. 
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Consumer Complaint Channel. Day and Landon [8] 
categorized actions by dissatisfied consumers into 
public actions—e.g., contacting the business to seek 
redress or pursuing legal actions, and private actions—
e.g., boycotting the business or warning friends and 
family. This taxonomy regarding the definition of public 
and private complaints is largely followed by the 
literature ([1, 13, 16, 17]). As is succinctly summarized 
in Balaji et al. [1], “Under these definitions, public 
complaints are complaints visible for the service 
provider to see, while private complaints largely remain 
undetected by the service provider.” The only 
exceptions we found are Gregoire et al. [11] and 
Breitsohl et al. [5]. In Gregoire et al. [11], private 
complaining is implicitly defined as customers voicing 
their concerns only to firms and public complaining is 
implicitly defined as customers going beyond firms’ 
borders to alert the public about a service failure episode, 
which is closest to how we define public voicing and 
private voicing in the current paper. Mattila and Wirtz 
[16] expanded Day and Landon [8] and found that 
customers seeking tangible compensations prefer 
interactive channels such as face-to-face 
communication and phone calls, while those seeking to 
vent their frustration prefer remote channels such as 
letters and e-mails; Susskind [18] distinguished between 
complaints directed to management from those directed 
to line-level employees; Berry et al. [2] explicitly 
studied the effect of customers’ personality on their 
complaint channel choices. In this paper we consider  
 
3. Study 1: Natural Experiment 
 
To understand how customers choose between the 
public channel and the private channel to communicate 
with a brand on social media, we exploit a natural 
experiment where the relative ease of using the private 
channel is exogenously and dramatically increased. Our 
empirical strategy relies on an institutional change 
Twitter made in April 2015: Twitter started to provide 
the option that allows users to opt in to receive direct 
messages from anyone, regardless of whether the sender 
and recipient were following each other.2 Specifically, 
we exploit one exogenous shock generated by Delta Air 
Line’s decision to enable any Twitter user to send direct 
messages to them, which we refer to as the OpenDM 
policy, to achieve causal identification. The OpenDM 
policy can reduce the cost for Twitter users to contact 
airlines, making DM an attractive customer service and 
communication channel. Using this shock, we examine 
                                                 
2 https://techcrunch.com/2015/04/20/twitter-now-lets-you-opt-in-to-
receive-direct-messages-from-anyone/ (Last access: June 7, 2018) 
3 Note that airlines sometimes post tweets which aim to engage with 
customers. For example, an airline company might ask customers to 
tweet their favorite vacation destinations, and customers might tweet 
whether there is any change in customers’ choice of 
communication channel after airlines’ adoption of 
OpenDM. As airlines sequentially enabled the OpenDM 
functionality, we are able to causally identify the impact 
of OpenDM by comparing airlines that just enabled 
OpenDM with other airlines that did not change their 
OpenDM setting—note that some airlines had already 
enabled OpenDM prior to the shocks we observed, and 
therefore we treat those airlines as the control group. In 
the sections below we describe the data used in our 
analysis and our empirical strategy.   
 
3.1. Data 
We obtain major U.S. airlines’ customer tweets 
data from Jan 1, 2016 to July 21, 2016 through a social 
media analytics company. We also monitored major U.S. 
airlines’ Twitter accounts from Feb 1st, 2016 to June 30th, 
2016 to see whether and when these airlines enabled the 
OpenDM functionality. During this period we 
successfully observed that Delta Air Lines enabled 
OpenDM on March 31, 2016. The decision to enable 
OpenDM was made by the airline itself, which is 
perceived as an exogenous shock to the customers 
attempting to contact the airlines. At the same time, 
other major U.S. airlines including United Airlines, 
American Airlines, and Southwest Airlines kept their 
OpenDM functionality enabled throughout our 
observation period. These major U.S. airlines serve as 
the control group for Delta Air Lines as they operate in 
similar markets and are comparable in size. Empirically, 
we use a Difference-in-differences (DID) analysis to 
examine how the customer tweets sent to Delta Air 
Lines changed in response to its OpenDM adoption. 
Specifically, we evaluate the impact of OpenDM from 
the following perspectives: the changes in percentage of 
complaint tweets, and the number of tweets received by 
the airlines.  
 
3.2. Measures 
As customers and airlines sometimes engage in 
back and forth conversations over multiple tweets 
regarding a single issue, we first consolidate tweets into 
distinct dialogues. Specifically, for each tweet in our 
data set we are able to see if this tweet is responding to 
an earlier tweet and, if it is, the ID of the tweet being 
responded to. We use this information to trace and 
construct sequences of tweets that belong to the same 
dialogues between an airline and an individual customer. 
Overall, our data set contains 770,705 customer-
initiated dialogues.3 
their replies at the airline company. As these airline-initiated 
dialogues appear to be distinct from dialogues initiated by customers 
seeking help, we focus only on customer-initiated dialogues in our 
empirical analysis and exclude all airline-initiated dialogues.  
Page 6640
  
We adopt a supervised-learning approach to 
classify whether a given tweet is a complaint or a non-
complaint. Operationally, we hired three annotators to 
independently label around 3700 randomly selected 
customer tweets. The inter-rater reliability measure 
suggests there is a high level of agreement between the 
three annotators (Fleiss’ Kappa = 0.721). We use the 
labeled data to train a support vector machine (SVM) 
classifier, which we then use to classify the first tweet 
of each dialogue in our data set to determine whether a 
given dialogue is a complaint. SVM is a widely used 
machine learning method [7] that has demonstrated 
strong performance in a variety of classification tasks. 
The SVM classifier’s performance is shown in Table 1, 
suggesting the classification performance is satisfactory.  
The summary statistics of the main variables are shown 
in Table 2.  
 
3.3. Empirical Model 
We treat Delta Air Lines’ decision to adopt 
OpenDM as an exogenous shock to its customers. By 
treating the OpenDM as an exogenous shock we are 
assuming that customers are simply reacting to the 
addition of DM rather than causing Delta to enable 
OpenDM. This assumption is reasonable because 
individual customers are unlikely to lead to Delta’s 
adopting OpenDM. Therefore, customer tweets sent to 
Delta Air Lines are considered to be in the treatment 
group; meanwhile, since other major U.S. airlines did 
not change their OpenDM policy during this time period, 
we treat customer tweets sent to other airlines as the 
control group. The treatment and control groups allow 
us to specify a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model 
to examine the effect of OpenDM on customers’ 
tweeting behavior.4 Specifically, we construct a panel 
data set where, for each airline, we observe the daily 
number of tweets this airline received during our 
observation period. The linear regression function for 
our DID analysis is as follows: 
y𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑇𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗
+ 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡,  
 𝜖𝑗𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎1), 
where y𝑗𝑡  is the logarithm-transformed number of 
tweets airline j received on day t. 𝑇𝑗 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if airline j is Delta Air Lines. 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡  is a 
dummy variable5 indicating whether day t is after Delta 
Air Lines’ OpenDM adoption date. 𝛿𝑗 ,  𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡 , and 
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑡  are airline specific, week specific, and 
day of week fixed effects. 
 
                                                 
4 We conducted a relative time model analysis, and the results 
showed that there is no significant pre-treatment differences between 
the treatment and control groups, suggesting our choice of control 
group is appropriate. 
3.4. Empirical Results 
 
We use data three months before Delta’s OpenDM 
shock to three months after the shock for our empirical 
analysis. The DiD analysis results are shown in  
Table 3. From Column 1 of  
Table 3 we can see that the tweets Delta Air Lines 
received after allowing OpenDM are significantly more 
likely to be complaints. Interestingly, Column 4 of  
Table 3 shows that the number of non-complaint tweets 
decreased significantly after Delta Air Line’s OpenDM 
shock, while the number of complaint tweets did not 
change significantly, as shown in Column 3 of  
Table 3. This indicates that after the introduction of an 
alternative communication channel, customers who 
complain about airline companies tend to keep using the 
public channel. Only those tweets looking for 
information seem to shift to the private channel. As a 
result, the percentage of complaint tweets among all 
tweets sent to the airlines increased after the airlines 
enabled OpenDM, as can be seen in Column 5 of  
Table 3. This indicates that, despite airlines’ 
attempt to encourage customers to complain privately 
by enabling OpenDM, customers are “stubborn” and 
still choose to complain publicly.   
  
4. Study 2: Field Experiment  
 
One advantage for customers to seek customer 
service on social media is the fact it is by default 
public—customers are able to communicate with 
companies directly and openly on social media 
platforms such as Twitter such that other users are also 
able to see how companies handle their customer service. 
Therefore, the addition of direct message (DM) as an 
alternative communication channel is an interesting 
departure from the more typical social media 
communication in the sense that DM takes place in 
private, so that customers can provide more personal 
information while companies do not face as much 
scrutiny from the general public. As such, DM 
resembles the more traditional way of customer service 
where complaints are generally invisible to the public. 
From the company’s perspective, it might be beneficial 
to encourage customers to compliment in public and 
complain in private, so the public sentiment stays high, 
which creates a positive word-of-mouth, and complaints 
can be resolved privately. However, since complaints 
sent through the private channel are kept out of the 
public eye, companies might be less inclined to exert 
effort in resolving issues. If companies’ motivation to 
5 This dummy variable is included along with week dummies and 
day of week dummies because the adoption day is on a Thursday, 
rather than a Sunday. 
Page 6641
  
encourage private channel is to reduce potentially 
negative sentiment, then we can expect companies to 
have different response strategies for complaints versus 
non-complaints, and public channel versus private 
channel. To understand companies’ motivation to 
encourage the private channel, we conduct a 
randomized field experiment on a popular social media 
platform, which allows us to examine how companies 
prioritize their responses to customers seeking help 
through the public channel and the private channel. This 
experiment will help us better understand companies’ 
response strategies and their motivation to provide the 
private channel as an alternative communication 
channel. 
 
4.1. Experiment Design 
Our experiment consists of four experimental 
conditions (C1-C4) based on the message type—
complaint or non-complaint—and the communication 
channel—public or private. The conditions are listed in 
Table 4. These four conditions will help us understand 
how companies respond to complaint versus non-
complaint messages sent through public versus private 
channels. 
Our experiment uses a popular social media 
platform and eight B2C companies. We selected 100 
non-complaint messages and 100 complaint messages 
from a data set of historical messages collected from the 
social media platform. Out of the 100 non-complaint 
messages we randomly selected 50 of them to create 
non-complaint messages to be sent privately (C1), and 
the rest 50 to send publicly (C3). Similarly, out of the 
100 complaint messages we randomly selected 50 of 
them to create complaint messages to be sent through 
the private channel (C2) and the rest 50 to be sent 
through the public channel (C4). For each message we 
manually created eight versions so that all eight 
companies would receive essentially identical messages 
except for the company’s name. This helps ensure that 
all eight companies receive the same treatments. 
To operationalize the above experiment design as 
cleanly as possible, we enlisted 800 existing accounts on 
this social media platform to send messages. As we 
planned to send 200 messages (50 messages for each 
experimental condition) to each of the 8 companies, we 
utilized all 800 accounts and made sure that each 
account only sent one public message to a company and 
one private message to a different company, so 
companies would not suspect the authenticity of the 
social media accounts used and the messages sent. The 
assignments of social media accounts to messages and 
                                                 
6 We conduct t-tests and linear regressions to explore if the delivery 
rates vary among different types of messages. 
7 Social media customer service is considered time sensitive. In our 
experiment data, if responded, a company’s response time is within 
those accounts to companies were all randomly 
determined. 
 
4.2. Experiment Schedule 
To control for potential time effects such as any 
patterns across different days of a week and different 
hours of a day, we developed a randomized message-
sending schedule as follows: 
1. A week is divided into thirty-minute blocks, 
resulting in 336 thirty-minute blocks in one week. 
2. For each thirty-minute block we generated a 
random integer between 0 and 1799 to represent the 
specific second within the thirty-minute block a 
message should be sent. This resulted in 336 candidate 
time points within one week. 
3. For each company, since we planned on 
sending 200 messages throughout the experiment, we 
randomly picked 200 out of the 336 candidate time 
points as the final messaging time to send these 200 
messages. The ordering of these 200 messages were also 
randomized, ensuring that a company received a 
sequence of treatment conditions in a random order. 
4. We repeated steps 1 - 3 above for each 
company. Since each company required 200 messaging 
times, we randomly generated a total of 1600 time 
points. Due to some technical consideration, these 1600 
time points were randomly generated in a way that none 
of the 1600 messages shared the exact same messaging 
time. 
We followed our message-sending schedule to send 
a total of 1600 messages to the eight companies, out of 
which, 1533 messages were successfully delivered in 
the end. Note that there is no significant difference in 
the delivery success rates across the four experiment 
conditions. 6  For each of the successfully delivered 
messages, we kept track of whether or not the company 
replied to it;7 if replied, we also recorded the duration 
between our message time and the company’s response 
time. 
 
4.3. Experiment Results 
Among the 1533 messages delivered, 1234 were 
replied by the eight companies.  The reply ratio for each 
treatment condition is shown in Table 5. We can see that 
complaints sent publicly have a lower reply ratio, while 
the other three conditions have similar and higher reply 
ratios. 
We formally compare these reply ratios by t-tests, 
shown in Table 6. We can see that in both t-test with 
equal variance and t-test without equal variance, public 
complaint messages have a lower reply ratio than 
half an hour. Therefore, we marked a message as ‘not replied’ if the 
company did not respond to the message within 5 days. 
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private complaint messages. Specifically, the private 
complaint messages are roughly 17% more likely to be 
replied to compared with public complaints. We also 
find that public complaint messages have a lower reply 
ratio than public non-complaint messages (non-
complaint messages sent via the public channel are 18% 
more likely to be replied to compared with complaint 
messages sent by the public channel.)  
We then analyze the experiment data using linear 
probability, logit, and probit models, shown in Table 7. 
The dependent variable in all models is whether a 
message was replied to. C2, C3, and C4 are dummy 
variables indicating the message’s treatment condition. 
Control variables include the total number of public 
messages the companies received within the same hour 
our message was sent (log_received), the inferred 
gender of each social media account (ismale) used to 
send the message based on each social media account’s 
displayed name, time-fixed effects including the hour of 
day and the day of week, and company-fixed effects. 
The results across different model specifications all 
show that there is no significant differences in reply 
ratio among conditions C1, C2, and C3, while messages 
in C4 are significantly less likely to be replied to, 
according to the results of F tests. This finding suggests 
that companies tend to discriminate against customers 
who voice their complaints using the public channel. As 
expected, we also find that the overall response rate goes 
down as the number of public messages received by a 
company (log_received) increases.  
Among messages that were replied to, we also 
analyze the duration between the time a message was 
sent and the time the message was responded by the 
company, measured in seconds. The duration for each 
treatment condition is shown in Table 8, and the 
corresponding two-sample t-tests are shown in Table 9. 
The results show that companies responded to public 
complaints significantly slower than they responded to 
private complaints, which further suggest that 
companies prioritize private complaints over public 
complaints.  
We also specified regression models to analyze the 
reply time for the 1234 messages that were replied to. 
Specifically, we use OLS with natural-logarithm-
transformed reply time as the dependent variable; The 
regression results are shown in Table 10. We can see 
that companies responded to private complaints faster 
than all other treatment condition, again suggesting 
companies prioritize private complaints over public 
complaints.   
Overall, our field experiment results show that 
companies are less likely to respond to public 
complaints; even when replied, the response time 
associated with public complaints are longer. 
Meanwhile, we did not observe any difference in reply 
ratio between public non-complaint messages and 
private non-complaint messages, nor did we observe 
any difference in reply time between public non-
complaint messages and private non-complaint 
messages. This suggests that the different patterns we 
observed in reply ratio between public complaints and 
private complaints are not driven by the communication 
channel itself; rather, companies appeared to have 
strategically avoided or delayed responding to public 
complaints. One potential explanation for this strategy 
is that companies might be trying to discourage 
customers from complaining publicly by delaying or 
avoiding responses, in the hope that customers would be 
motivated to utilize the private channel for complaints. 
At the same time, companies also try to shorten the reply 
time for private complaints, as shown in Table 10, so 
customers might find it beneficial to adopt the private 
channel for complaints. The companies’ strategy, if 
successful, will help companies maintain a positive 
sentiment on social media platforms. In addition, by not 
replying to public complaints, companies can avoid 
further publicizing negative sentiments because on this 
social media platform, only public complaints that are 
replied to will appear on the company’s home page. In 
other words, customers’ public complaint will not be 
immediately visible to other customers perusing the 
company’s home page if the public complaints are left 
un-replied, so by not replying to complaint messages 
companies can reduce the size of the negative word-of-
mouth. In conclusion, our experiment results suggest 
that companies might be trying to convert the more 
public social media customer service back to the 
traditional style where complaints are made in private, 
so as to avoid the risk of negative word-of-mouth. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we studied the choice between public 
and private channels of customer service interaction on 
social media, both from customers’ and brands’ 
perspectives. Through a natural experiment, we found 
that complaining customers prefer to do so publicly 
while some non-complaining customers prefer to 
communicate privately. Through a randomized field 
experiment, we found that firms prioritize complaints 
sent through the private channel over complaints sent 
through the public channel, as shown in the lower 
response rate and longer response time for public 
complaints. Such a prioritization is absent for non-
complaint messages. Hence, we conclude that firms, 
being aware of the risk of subjecting its customer service 
under public scrutiny, prefer complaints communicated 
privately and seem to nudge customers towards 
switching back to the traditional mode of customer 
service. The diverging preferences of the two sides 
towards open voice and private message suggests a tug 
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of war between the traditional delivery of customer 
service featuring brand control and social media 
customer service featuring transparency and openness. 
Our analysis shows that firms’ social media 
strategy seems to focus on an image-first mindset, 
where firms attempt to manage their image by 
maintaining a high public sentiment on social media 
sites. This can lead to their unwillingness to respond to 
negative contents so as not to further publicize their 
service failures. However, such image-first mindset 
does not seem sustainable in the current social media era 
as customers begin to demand accountability and 
transparency online and prefer voicing complaints 
publicly. This suggests that an image-first mindset leads 
to more harm than good for firms.  Therefore, instead of 
an image-first mindset, we recommend that firms adopt 
a solution-first mindset, where firms strive to address 
customer complaints regardless of the communication 
channel. A solution-first mindset encourages firms to 
address complaints in a timely manner, minimizing the 
risk of additional complaints. Furthermore, such 
instances of successful complaint resolution can be 
observed by the public and might even improve their 
public image. We therefore believe that the solution-
first mindset will ultimately be advantageous to firms’ 
successful social media complaint management. 
 As the first study revealing this interesting hidden 
phenomenon, we believe this paper significantly 
contributes to our understanding of the promises and 
challenges of social media customer service. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Performance of the SVM classifier on 3700 tweets using 10-fold vross validation 
 Accuracy Precision 
(+) 
Recall 
(+) 
F1 
(+) 
Precision 
(-) 
Recall 
(-) 
F1 
(-) 
AUC 
Fold 1 0.80 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.77 
Fold 2 0.78 0.77 0.66 0.71 0.78 0.86 0.82 0.77 
Fold 3 0.76 0.78 0.63 0.70 0.75 0.87 0.81 0.77 
Fold 4 0.77 0.80 0.62 0.70 0.76 0.89 0.82 0.78 
Fold 5 0.81 0.81 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.89 0.85 0.81 
Fold 6 0.76 0.83 0.61 0.70 0.73 0.90 0.81 0.78 
Fold 7 0.81 0.78 0.65 0.71 0.82 0.90 0.86 0.80 
Fold 8 0.71 0.74 0.50 0.60 0.69 0.87 0.77 0.72 
Fold 9 0.79 0.75 0.62 0.68 0.81 0.89 0.85 0.78 
Fold 10 0.82 0.77 0.67 0.72 0.84 0.90 0.87 0.81 
Average 0.78 0.77 0.64 0.70 0.78 0.88 0.83 0.78 
Note: This table reports the SVM classifier’s performance. The (+) symbol represents the positive case (complaints), 
and the (-) symbol represents the negative case (non-complaints). 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variables Description obs mean s.d. max min 
If_complaint If the first tweet in the dialogue 
is a complaint or not 
770,705 0.556 0.497 1 0 
Log_followers Log(number of followers for 
the user who initiated the 
dialogue) 
770,705 5.559 2.258 17.418 0 
Num_tweets Daily number of tweets 
received 
728 1058.661 599.792 8980 305 
Num_complaint Daily number of complaint 
tweets received 
728 588.937 365.461 3207 103 
Num_noncomplai
nt 
Daily number of non-
complaint tweets received 
728 469.724 382.607 7466 176 
 
 
Table 3. Main estimation results for Delta Air Lines 
 Dialogue Daily number of dialogues (log) Proportion of 
Complaint 
Tweets 
 If_complaint All Complaint Non_complaint 
Treatment*after 0.351*** -0.0612 0.0366 -0.192*** 0.0549*** 
 (0.0921) (0.0478) (0.0518) (0.0596) (0.0120) 
after -0.0166 -0.0252 -0.0614 0.0194 -0.0195** 
 (0.0927) (0.0482) (0.0502) (0.0521) (0.00879) 
Weekday fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Week fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Airlines fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 1.120*** 7.203*** 6.947*** 5.815*** 0.760*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0376) (0.0450) (0.0449) (0.0120) 
Obs 770,705 728 728 728 728 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Experiment design 
 non-complaint   complaint 
private channel private noncomplaints  (C1) private complaints (C2) 
public channel public noncomplaints (C3) public complaints (C4) 
 
 
 
Table 5. Reply ratio for each treatment condition 
reply ratio (# of messages) non-complaint complaint 
private channel 0.8560(389) 0.8241(381) 
public channel 0.8329(389) 0.7032(374) 
 
 
 
Table 6. Results of two-sample T-tests 
 T statistic 
 With equal variances Without equal variances 
complaints:  
mean(public channel)-mean(private channel) 
-0.1209*** 
(-3.949) 
-0.1209*** 
(-3.942) 
non-complaints: 
mean(public channel)-mean(private channel) 
-0.02314 
(-0.8897) 
-0.02314 
 (-0.8897) 
private channel:  
mean(non-complaint)-mean(complaint) 
0.02642 
(1.207) 
0.02642 
 (1.206) 
public channel: 
mean(non-complaint)-mean(complaint) 
0.1297*** 
(4.297) 
0.1297*** 
(4.280) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 7. Regression analysis on companies’ reply decision 
 If_reply 
 LPM logit probit 
C2 -0.0328 -0.270 -0.149 
 (0.0258) (0.204) (0.113) 
C3 -0.0226 -0.179 -0.106 
 (0.0255) (0.206) (0.115) 
C4 -0.148*** -0.965*** -0.564*** 
 (0.0287) (0.191) (0.109) 
log_received -0.0479*** -0.344*** -0.191*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0945) (0.0528) 
ismale -0.0284 -0.198 -0.110 
 (0.0196) (0.138) (0.0782) 
Time fixed effects yes yes yes 
Company fixed effects yes yes yes 
constant 1.214*** 4.699*** 2.642*** 
 (0.0746) (0.607) (0.332) 
Obs 1,533 1,533 1,533 
F test: C2=C4 15.03*** 14.26*** 15.46*** 
F test: C3=C4 181.3*** 17.87*** 18.12*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Reply time for each treatment condition 
Log reply time in seconds (# of messages) non-complaint complaint 
private channel 7.045 (333) 6.823 (314) 
public channel 7.040 (324) 7.125 (263) 
 
 
Table 9. Results of two-sample T-tests for reply time 
 T statistic 
Log(reply time) With equal variances Without equal variances 
complaints: 
mean(public channel)-mean(private channel) 
0.3013** 
(1.834) 
0.3013** 
(1.838) 
non-complaints: 
mean(public channel)-mean(private channel) 
-0.04481 
(-0.0275) 
-0.04481 
(-0.0275) 
private channel: 
mean(non-complaint)-mean(complaint) 
0.2215 
(1.376) 
0.2215 
(1.379) 
public channel: 
mean(non-complaint)-mean(complaint) 
-0.08424 
(-0.5025) 
-0.08424 
(-0.5062) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 10. Regression analysis on reply time 
 Reply time 
 OLS (natural log 
transformed) 
OLS 
C2 -0.240** -2644.34** 
 (0.101) (1350.44) 
C3 0.00973 1909.28 
 (0.104) (2407.70) 
C4 0.0169 -2168.39 
 (0.111) (1388.87) 
log_received 0.192*** 3558.16** 
 (0.0508) (1532.45) 
ismale -0.0810 1212.45 
 (0.0774) (1455.04) 
Time fixed effects yes yes 
Company fixed effects yes yes 
constant 6.252*** -17374.2** 
 (0.290) (8417.65) 
Obs 1,234 1,234 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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